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Abstract 
The relationship of states to populations beyond their borders is of 
increasing interest to those seeking to understand the international politics of 
migration. This introduction to the special issue of International Political 
Science Review on diasporas and sending states provides an overview of 
existing explanations for why states reach out to diasporas and migrants 
abroad and problematizes in important ways the idea that the sending state is 
a unitary actor. It highlights the need to examine the extraterritorial 
behaviour of agents within countries of origin, such as parties, bureaucracies 
and non-state actors, and to account for why and how their outreach differs. 
This entails looking at how outreach is conditioned by a state’s sovereignty 
and capacity, type of nationalism, and regime character. This special issue 
starts a new conversation by delving deeper into the motivations of agents 
within countries of origin, and how their outreach is determined by the states 
and regimes in which they are embedded. 
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Introduction  
In April 2017, in a divisive constitutional referendum, a slim majority of 
voters endorsed enhanced presidential powers for Turkish President Tayyip 
Recep Erdogan. During the campaign, an important non-state actor became 
visible from abroad: the Turkish diaspora. For months, Erdogan and his 
governing party solicited Turks in Western Europe to support his plan to 
increase presidential powers. In March, Erdogan even had a diplomatic row 
with the Dutch government, which was objecting to Turkish officials holding 
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rallies among migrants on its territory. Germany and Denmark supported the 
Dutch government; Erdogan retaliated by calling them ‘Nazi’ and promising 
they would ‘pay for this’. At that point campaigning in the diaspora shifted 
from ‘low politics’ of a contested domestic issue to ‘high politics’ of strained 
relations between states. Extraterritorial campaigning bore fruit. In European 
Union (EU) countries with Turkish descendants from the ‘guest-worker’ 
generation of the 1960s and 1970s – such as Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Norway – the diaspora supported 
Erdogan; the diaspora in the rest of the EU, North America, Australia and 
Eurasia did not (Yenisafak, 2017). A nation divided at home became divided 
abroad.  
The importance of the diaspora in Turkey’s constitutional referendum 
is not an isolated occurrence. Latin American politicians often campaign in 
the United States, home to millions of Latinos. Even when they are not fully 
enfranchised or casting an absentee vote is difficult, they are considered 
important for the resources they can lend to campaigns or influence they 
wield over family members who can vote domestically. Overseas voters are 
also important for democracies that have emerged from conflict such as 
Croatia and Kosovo, or have seen many citizens disperse across Europe such 
as Romania and Bulgaria. 
The politics of sending states and migration is attracting increased 
attention (Oestergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Fitzgerald, 2006; De Haas, 2007; 
Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; Kapur, 2010; Waterbury, 2010; Hollifield 
2012; Naujoks, 2013; Koinova 2012, 2018a; Ragazzi, 2014; Collyer, 2013; 
Gamlen et al., 2013, Delano and Gamlen, 2014; Messeguer and Burgess, 2014; 
Tsourapas, 2016, 2018a). Many important questions remain little explored. 
Why do some sending states seek their migrant and diasporas abroad and 
others not? Why do some of them treat certain emigrant and diaspora groups 
differently from others? How do governments, parties and bureaucracies 
differ in engagement? How do diaspora institutions evolve over time? Does 
engagement vary for the sending states of various regimes?  
These questions are at the core of this special issue, along with a novel 
approach to understanding the variety of actors that engage migrants and 
diasporas abroad. Beyond policies targeting remittances and micro-financing, 
the articles address state sovereignty, nationalism and political regimes, soft 
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power considerations, specific strategies and modes of engaging 
governments, parties, bureaucracies and non-state actors. Globalisation does 
not empower sending states evenly across the globe. Nor do institutions and 
non-state actors in weak and strong states behave similarly. These articles 
open the ‘black box’ of the sending state through middle-range theorizing 
based on comparisons from a variety of world regions. 
 
 
Prevalent explanations: Why do sending states engage diasporas abroad? 
Scholars have put forward a cluster of utilitarian, identity-based, 
governance and socio-spatial explanations of the relationship between 
sending states and their diasporas abroad. These perspectives each provide a 
core rationale for sending-state engagement, while sometimes overlapping. 
Utilitarian explanations see diasporas as sources of material power. Diasporas 
are considered important for attracting remittances, accounting for over 15 
percent of some developing countries’ GDP, as in Armenia, Haiti, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Tajikistan and others. Sending migrants 
abroad, including as guest-workers, is often a ‘safety valve’ against 
unemployment in cash-strapped domestic economies (Guarnizo, 1998; 
Tsourapas 2015, 2018a). Remittances sustain households and reduce poverty. 
Sending states seek to attract diaspora entrepreneurs as direct investors in 
small, medium and large enterprises (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Diasporas are also 
sought for philanthropy (Sidel, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2008), homeland tourism 
(Coles and Timothy, 2004) and professional expertise, especially in the 
engineering, technology and medical sectors. To counter a ‘brain-drain’, 
sending states seek to attract diaspora returnees or engage them in temporary 
or virtual return programs if permanent return is not viable (Tsourapas, 
2015). 
A utilitarian perspective also sheds light on how migrants and 
diasporas may be instrumentalised for sending states’ domestic or 
international political agendas. Diasporas can lobby foreign governments and 
international organizations (Shain and Barth, 2003; Adamson and Demetriou 
2007; Koinova 2012). Migrants, refugees and diasporas can also be pawns in 
interstate disputes. Sending and transit states may create ‘migration crises’ to 
force concessions from their adversaries (Greenhill, 2010) or employ the status 
of vulnerable migrants in coercive interstate relations (Tsourapas 2015; 2018a). 
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This cluster of explanations demonstrates avenues by which sending states 
‘tap into the diaspora’ (Gamlen et al. 2013) for economic and political gains. 
Nevertheless, they are limited by reifying realist assumptions, regarding 
states as unitary sovereign actors, capable of opening and closing their 
economies (Hollifield, 2012), and executing foreign policies without 
divergence among institutions, capacities of statehood and regimes.  
Identity-based explanations see diasporas as sources of symbolic power. 
Sending states seek to reproduce a diaspora’s symbolic link to the homeland 
as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006). They support schools and 
curricula for diaspora pupils to study their history and language (Koinova, 
2018a). They offer homeland visits to maintain their cultural heritage (Gamlen 
et al., 2013). They sponsor commemorative events and ‘diaspora days’ 
(Naujoks, 2013; Tsourapas 2015), enable trans-border media channels for the 
specific benefit of co-nationals (Waterbury 2010) and provide personnel and 
instruction for religious institutions in the diaspora (De Haas, 2007).  
Identity-based explanations address the ways in which dual and 
multiple citizenships defy traditional understanding of the nation-state as a 
specific territory. Diaspora members with multiple citizenships have rights 
and obligations in different polities. ‘Transnational citizenship’ (Bauböck, 
2005) facilitates political engagement through external voting and lobbying 
(Collyer, 2013), maintaining homeland property, and potential interest in 
return, among others. Sending states may foster citizenship abroad in 
identity-based ways: engaging all citizens despite multiple identities, narrow 
nationalist principles (Waterbury 2010; Koinova 2018a), or a combination of 
these (Bauböck, 2005; Ragazzi, 2014). 
Identity-based explanations consider the diaspora as constructed, 
awakened and re-engaged through diasporisation or nationalist mobilisation 
(Shain and Barth, 2003; Adamson and Demetriou, 2007). These explanations 
see two major dimensions to the policies of the sending state. First is 
promotion of civic versus ethnic nationalism abroad by state and sub-state 
actors seeking to engage certain populations but ignore or exclude others. 
Second is understanding challenges to the sending state through attention to 
political regimes. Authoritarian regimes are much less tolerant of dual 
citizenship (Brand, 2014) than are democracies. Democracies with relatively 
highly educated emigration are more likely to tolerate dual citizenship; 
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autocracies are more restrictive toward such migrants (Mirilovic, 2014). How 
the civic or ethnic dimension of statehood intersects with regime type in these 
engagements has so far lacked scholarly attention.  
The third cluster of explanations examines sending-state engagement 
with diasporas through a governance perspective, identifying multiple 
processes and channels of engagement. Sending states can govern migrants 
and diasporas through bilateral treaties and cooperation with international 
organisations (Hollifield, 2012; Gamlen et al., 2013). Embassies abroad can be 
strongly engaged in such governance processes, whether seeking to control 
populations or support them through various practices. In a Foucauldian 
‘governmentality’ perspective, sending states can be seen as governing 
through practices associated with a neoliberal global order (Ragazzi, 2014). 
Such practices glorify markets and outsource state functions to private actors 
including diasporas, which need to be entrepreneurial, rely on self-help, and 
be handled through a ‘light-touch managerial approach’ (Délano and Gamlen, 
2014).  
‘Governance’ approaches started growing exponentially with the 2015–
2016 global refugee crisis and efforts to develop coordination among state and 
non-state actors to manage migration flows. Sending-state activities have been 
primarily analysed in the context of regional and geopolitical dynamics. More 
recently, sending states have become involved in the United Nations Global 
Compact on Migration, seeking a global framework for migration governance 
through consultation with multiple agents. Empirical discussion of sending 
states and their relationships to refugees in the current crisis is outside the 
scope of this special issue. Yet as sending states’ engagement in global 
governance becomes more salient and therefore more scrutinized by a variety 
of global agents, this special issue highlights the need to consider the state not 
as a unitary actor, but as containing multiple actors with various agendas 
conditioned by the state sovereignty and political regimes in which they 
operate.  
As for the socio-spatial dimension, few earlier attempts consider how 
actors within and beyond sending states engage migrant and diaspora groups 
abroad. Within sending states, political parties, bureaucracies and non-state 
actors can diverge from central institutions, often engaging with diasporas for 
partisan and self-preservation reasons (Fitzgerald 2006). Parties can develop 
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overseas branches to mobilise diasporas during elections. Beyond sending 
states, different diasporas can be engaged by the same state according to socio-
positional rationale. Sending states factor in where diasporas are positioned 
and how they are empowered through being embedded or interlinked in a 
transnational social field (Koinova 2018a). Non-state actors make similar 
calculations (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; Lyons and Mandaville, 2010; 
Koinova 2012). Sending states may develop multi-tier policies targeting 
different migrants and diaspora groups based on economic and foreign policy 
considerations (Tsourapas 2015). Building on these accounts, the articles in 
this issue bring new insights into the conditions and mechanisms through 
which agents within the sending state engage with migrants and diasporas. 
 
Theoretical and empirical contributions of this special issue 
This special issue builds on the growing understanding that the 
sending state is not a unitary actor. The articles articulate how domestic 
conditions affect policies of actors and institutions within the sending state. In 
democratic regimes, such actors include political parties and civil society 
actors. In authoritarian contexts, elite strategies develop within the ruling 
regime, focusing particularly on soft power goals. In weak states and 
transitional contexts, non-state actors such as radical groups may have a 
specific take on diaspora engagement, with politics that complement or 
contradict the central approach of the sending state. Sovereign and de facto 
states may differ in the ways they engage with diasporas. A variety of 
domestic conditions and approaches are theorized here, regarding world 
regions and time periods. 
Mainstream International Relations scholarship has discussed the state, 
its sovereignty and capacity, with minimal consideration to the diaspora 
dimension. Sporadic accounts show that diasporas are ‘outside the state’ but 
‘inside the people’ (Shain and Barth, 2003), without direct overlap between 
state and national identity (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007). People challenge 
state sovereignty through movement across borders, illicit trafficking and 
irregular migration. Challenges are tackled with migration control at the 
national or regional level, including European integration and deportation. 
Sovereign states with the ability to govern territories effectively are 
considered to have strong capacity. States without this ability and considered 
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weak, are often subject to contestation by non-state actors and terrorist groups. 
Researchers within the ERC Project ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ 
have shown that diasporas mobilise differently if the states to which they are 
linked are weak or merely de facto.1 Carment and Calleja (2017) have also 
shown that state capacity and legitimacy are interlinked when diasporas 
become engaged with weak states. These emerging discussions still focus on 
diasporas as nonstate actors, not on sending states and how they reach out 
abroad. 
This special issue takes the field further by demonstrating how state 
sovereignty and capacity are crucial to specific attitudes or policies on the 
part of agents of the sending state. Fragile states have limited institutional 
capacities and economic resources to develop expertise and enforce rules. To 
compensate for these limitations, they engage diasporas abroad to fulfil 
missing functions and provide remittances to sustain livelihoods. Formal 
remittances and other capital contributions have been crucial to states’ 
survival.    
Many states discussed in this collection are relatively weak, such as 
Egypt, Kosovo, Mexico, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Sri 
Lanka.  As Ireland points out, female domestic workers have been a major 
external source of finance for the Philippines and Sri Lanka. These vulnerable 
populations have become pawns in the global market for domestic labour. 
Sending state response to migrant exploitation abroad has generally been 
weak; civil society organizations – with some independence and influence, as 
in the Philippines – have taken a more proactive role. Burgess and Koinova 
show that in the context of developing countries, diaspora outreach varies 
according to the objectives of ruling governments and parties, and the types 
of states in which they are embedded. In Tsourapas’ analysis, in the ruling 
military regime of Egypt an authoritarian state implemented strategies that 
reflected its foreign policy agenda. 
This special issue also brings new insights to bear on the role of 
nationalism in diaspora engagement. In classic debates, nationalism is 
considered built on a ‘given’ ethnic identity (Connor, 1994), entirely 
constructed (Brass 1991), or ‘primarily a political principle that holds that the 
political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 2008:1). When 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See http://www.diasporacontest.org 
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diasporas are engaged, sending states foster what Csergo and Goldgeier 
(2004) call ‘transsovereign nationalism’, reproducing the nation via co-
nationals abroad without annexing territories (see also Mylonas 2012). 
Theoretically, sending states could extend policies abroad on cosmopolitan 
principles, but scholarship has so far indicated that it is nationalism that 
conditions outreach to diasporas from within the sending state. The difference 
between civic and ethnic nationalism is important: the former emphasizes 
belonging to the entire state and tolerance for the ethnonational diversity of 
all its citizens; the latter considers blood-connection or roots in an 
ethnonational community (Ignatieff, 1995). Given that diasporas operate in 
transnational social fields (Levitt and Schiller, 2004), primarily on an 
ethnonational basis (Koinova 2018a), actors in sending states that engage 
diasporas on a civic principle need to operate in civic ways, transcending 
ethnic allegiances to particular identity-based groups.  
In Eastern Europe, nationalism and contentious minority politics, both 
markers of the postcommunist period, affect formation of diaspora 
institutions and the ways they approach their diasporas. Diasporas have been 
engaged with exclusively on a national basis in countries that have undergone 
war: Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo. As Garding demonstrates, secessionist 
conflict made Croatia’s first post-communist government more interested in 
engaging the diaspora in state-building, even if it had designed the institution 
as weak. Serbia’s institutions reached out to the diaspora in more systematic 
ways after the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, seeking to boost state-
building. In Koinova’s account, Kosovo’s policymakers and functionaries 
have also engaged with the diaspora on a nationalist principle, strategizing 
for diaspora involvement in economic development, maintenance of identity, 
and public diplomacy for state recognition. One party has even shown a state-
challenging approach, and advocating irredentism. Even without 
experiencing war during the post-communist period, Bulgaria and Hungary 
prioritized diaspora engagement on ethnic rather than civic principles, while 
Romania and Poland have been more interested in a civic principle, as 
Waterbury shows. Civil society approaches have proven highly important for 
sending-state agents in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, as Ireland 
demonstrates. 
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Sending-state policies towards diasporas have been challenged by 
sovereignty issues not only from sub-state actors, but through supranational 
and regional dynamics. In Waterbury’s account, the EU – a supranational 
institution – has opened its borders for intra-EU migrants from Eastern 
Europe, creating difficulties for sending states to engage diasporas through 
traditional mechanisms and more formal transnational networks. A regional 
dynamic is also visible in the Middle East according to Tsourapas, as 
authoritarian regimes promote emigration as an instrument of soft power. 
This special issue also brings theoretical insights into the role of 
multiple actors in different political regimes. Current scholarship on 
democratic regimes focuses primarily on external diaspora voting and the 
importance of liberal regimes, particularly Mexico (Messeguer and Burgess 
2014), or considers changes in the relationship between diaspora and state as 
part of the transition from autocratic rule (Collyer, 2013). In a key work, 
Kapur argues that emigration from India enhanced domestic democratization, 
bringing changes in ‘the locus of political power in the state to economic 
power in the private sector and outside India’ (Kapur, 2010: 184). Scholarship 
on authoritarian regimes’ diaspora engagement has already shown that 
diaspora voting from abroad can take place in certain authoritarian polities 
(Brand 2014, Collyer 2013) and that non-democracies are much more likely to 
restrict citizens’ emigration than liberal states. It is unclear to what degree 
migrant and diaspora engagement by democracies and non-democracies 
differs across the globe. Both regime types have shown they can benefit from 
financial remittances, and many emerging democracies actively encourage 
labour migration (Escribà-Folch et al., 2015), as do some authoritarian regimes 
(Tsourapas, 2015; 2018b).  
The contributions to this special issue focus on political regimes 
through a distinct perspective: how they condition or provide openings for 
diaspora engagement by actors within the sending state. In Ireland’s account, 
civil society organizations were fairly strong in the democratic Philippines, 
seeking protection of vulnerable overseas female workers; not so in Sri Lanka, 
which experienced transition more recently. Koinova shows that transition 
from conflict and authoritarian rule bring parties in Kosovo to varied 
approaches to a proposal to introduce special diaspora representation in the 
national assembly. Burgess highlights state-led and party-led outreach on the 
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democratizing potential of emigrants in fragile democracies. More open 
democratic polities such as Mexico and the Philippines have led specifically to 
state-led diaspora outreach. The accounts of Waterbury on intra-European 
migration and Garding on bureaucracy building and diaspora engagement in 
Croatia and Serbia focus on a post-communist period after 1990. Finally, 
Tsourapas explicitly engages with authoritarian emigration states, examining 
political elites’ soft power aims as a determining factor shaping in the 
Egyptian state’s policy towards host states in the Middle East and sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Beyond issues of statehood and political regimes, the articles are 
cognisant of historical processes that have shaped current sending state 
diaspora policies. Garding is particularly focused on institutional change. 
Waterbury speaks of legacies of regional ethnic politics that became salient 
after the end of communism and have shaped current policies of intra-EU 
engagement. Koinova shows how prior engagement with secessionism and 
post-war institution-building determine how political parties in a contested 
post-conflict state operate abroad, regardless whether in government or 
opposition. Tsourapas situates his analysis within a historical period to 
identify the importance of labour emigration at times of interstate conflict, 
both within the Arab Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ireland shows 
that sending state engagement has endured despite critical junctures of 
democratization and war in Sri Lanka. 
At the same time, the articles of this special issue speak to an incipient 
line of theoretical thought: how the same sending state engages different diasporas 
abroad. Diasporas could be in different states as defined by their sovereignty 
on the map of the world, but relate to their sending states through an 
‘interstitial space’ both external and internal to the agents involved. Koinova 
and Waterbury show that the context in which diasporas are embedded and 
their international position—whether theorized in political, geographic or 
socio-spatial terms—play an important role in sending state policies. 
Similarly, Tsourapas examines how foreign policy objectives may lead to a 
sending state’s selective engagement with specific migrant populations 
according to their skill level, at the expense of others.  
Beyond contributing to common theoretical themes, the articles bring 
methodological rigor to bear, develop novel typologies, and ground 
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arguments in comparative empirical evidence. They are also based on original 
archival and interview-based material gathered in multiple languages, and 
through fieldwork in different parts of the globe. The articles draw evidence 
from the Americas, Asia, Balkans, Eastern Europe, Middle East and North 
Africa, and contribute to understanding of regional variations.  
 
Individual contributions 
The individual papers open new avenues for the study of 
extraterritorial diaspora engagement of parties in government and opposition 
(Burgess and Koinova), interaction between global demands of neoliberalism 
and local civil society (Ireland), authoritarian emigration states and their soft 
power strategies (Tsourapas), intra-EU politics (Waterbury), and evolution of 
diaspora institutions (Garding).  
Ireland’s ‘The limits of sending-state power: The Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, and female migrant domestic workers’ (2018) investigates why Sri 
Lanka and the Philippines, both associated with exporting domestic labour 
abroad, formulate different policies towards ‘their’ female migrant domestic 
workers. Process tracing and qualitative data collection are employed to 
construct a most-similar case comparison between the Sri Lankan and 
Philippine defence of these workers. State responses depend on the level of 
gender equality, the nature of civil society organizations, and their response 
to worker exploitation when states make efforts to compete in a lucrative 
global market for domestic workers and their remittances. A stock of workers 
with highly valued human capital, a stronger civil society, and greater gender 
equity compel and enable the Philippine state to adopt a more assertive 
approach than its Sri Lankan counterpart in defending overseas workers 
(Ireland, 2018). 
 Waterbury’s ‘Caught between nationalism and transnationalism: How 
Central and East European states respond to East-West emigration’ (2018) 
seeks to explain the political and policy responses to the large waves of post-
1990 migration. The policy responses to emigration from Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Poland have been shaped and constrained by political and 
institutional structures driven by these states’ relationships to populations of 
historical kin in neighbouring states and, in some cases, to internal minority 
communities. Differing responses to intra-EU emigration depended in large 
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part on where the intra-EU emigrants fit within the politics of belonging. The 
post-communist politics of external engagement with ethnic diasporas and 
internal struggles over national identity privileged or excluded specific 
subsets of the citizenry abroad. The author analyses and compares the 
institutional position of intra-EU emigrants within the states’ diaspora 
management frameworks, and the degree of integration of recent emigrants 
into a transnational political rights framework encompassing dual citizenship 
and external voting (Waterbury, 2018). 
 Garding’s ‘Weak by design? Diaspora engagement and institutional 
change in Croatia and Serbia’ (2018) focuses on the institutional change of 
diaspora institutions in sending states. Drawing on archival research and field 
interviews, she traces institutional emergence and change across six diaspora 
ministries in Croatia and Serbia in 1990–2015. Garding identifies two 
explanatory factors for the variation in the level and mechanisms of diaspora 
engagement across these countries, and within them over time. Firstly, these 
institutions are often designed to be weak – symbolic rather than substantive – 
as indicated by small budgets, limited policymaking prerogatives, and overlap 
with other ministries and institutions that carry out diaspora policies. 
Secondly, while one might expect diaspora engagement policies to lie beyond 
partisan bickering, these policies and institutions can become highly 
politicized, and competition between parties and between intra-party factions 
drives change (Garding, 2018). 
Burgess’ ‘States or parties? Emigrant outreach and transnational 
engagement’ (2018) explores the transnational implications of emigrant 
outreach dominated by states or parties by comparing two cases in which 
outreach is dominated by the state (Philippines and Mexico) and two by 
parties (Lebanon and Dominican Republic). Her main argument is that the 
types of outreach result in different trade-offs between electoral mobilization 
and partisan autonomy. State-led outreach encourages emigrants to transcend 
partisan divisions but does not mobilize overseas voters. Party-led outreach 
generates higher electoral turnout while reproducing and reinforcing 
sectarian or clientelist interest representation. She concludes by considering 
the implications of these differences for whether emigrants are likely to play a 
democratizing role in fragile democracies. 
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 Koinova’s ‘Endorsers, challengers, or builders? Political parties’ 
diaspora outreach in a postconflict state’ (2018b) focuses on differential party 
outreach. How do parties in government and opposition in a contested state 
reach out to their diasporas? Do their policies overlap or differ, and why? She 
focuses on transnational party engagement of diasporas within one of these 
states, Kosovo, and analyses the approaches of four parties, two in 
government and two in opposition. The article conceptualizes three types of 
extraterritorial party outreach – state-endorsing, state-challenging and party-
building – pursued actively or passively. It develops a typological theory 
showing causal pathways by which types of approaches emerged in post-
independence Kosovo. Parties that emerge from political movements with 
credentials from engagement with secessionism and warfare behave like 
parties in fully sovereign states, and are more likely to seek the diaspora 
through a state-endorsing or party-building approach, depending on whether 
they are in government or opposition. Parties that are newly institutionalized 
in the post-conflict polity seek to engage the diaspora through an active state-
endorsing or state-challenging approach.  
Tsourapas’ ‘Authoritarian emigration states: Soft power & cross-border 
mobility in the Middle East’ (2018b) theorizes the foreign policy importance of 
cross-border mobility for ‘authoritarian emigration states,’ going against 
expectations that non-democracies aim to invariably restrict emigration or 
that they reach out to emigrant groups solely for developmental purposes. 
His analysis of Egyptian emigration policy between 1954-1970 demonstrates 
how the ruling regime subsidised the emigration of high-skilled professionals 
across the Middle East and Africa for soft power purposes. In particular, he 
identifies how the Egyptian state engaged with migration as an instrument of 
cultural diplomacy and as a tool of disseminating developmental aid. 
Tsourapas makes a broader point regarding the interplay between foreign 
policy and cross-border mobility, while also sketching an evolving research 
agenda on authoritarian emigration states’ policy-making. 
 
 
Concluding remarks  
The articles in this special issue on sending states’ engagement with 
migrants and diasporas abroad contribute to an emerging scholarship 
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drawing on utilitarian, identity-based, governance and socio-spatial 
explanations for diaspora policies. They also identify important questions and 
topics so far unexplored. These are especially related to how actors within 
sending states – parties, bureaucracies, civil society and non-state actors – 
behave extraterritorially, why and how their outreach is different, and how it 
is conditioned by statehood and regime-based dynamics. The authors show 
that in different countries, states or parties can lead the diaspora engagement 
processes (Burgess), and that parties can act in their own interest, or endorse 
and challenge states, especially in a post-conflict setting (Koinova). Even if 
interested in diaspora affairs, states can design diaspora-related institutions as 
deliberately weak (Garding), and engage citizens abroad on either civic or 
nationalist principles (Ireland, Koinova, Garding, Waterbury).  
Besides giving a better understanding of how the state, its sovereignty, 
capacity and links to nationalism shape extraterritorial diaspora politics, the 
authors shed light also on regime-based dynamics. Authoritarian emigration 
states use labour migrants abroad in their foreign policy considerations 
(Tsourapas). Democratizing states can be more concerned with the well-being 
of their diasporas and civil society organizations can intervene to protect 
them (Ireland). At critical junctures of democratization, states and parties can 
become more open to diasporas and seek to reshape their policies (Ireland, 
Burgess, Koinova). In sum, this special issue initiates a new conversation by 
delving deeper into the motivations of agents within sending states, and how 
their outreach is conditioned by the regimes in which they are embedded.  
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